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Almost ten years ago the presentation of the eleventh annual report of 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency included this quotation from the 
Koran: "Verily, never will God change the condition of a people until 
they change it themselves." Throughout the third plan, more than in 
any of its precursors, it is this theme of change and responsive par-
ticipation in change which is dominant as exemplified in the introduc-
tory statement of development philosophy: "strategic proiority to 
structural change rather than to growth" and "the spontaneous 
response from society to the opportunities offered by 
development." 1 
Although the weakening of oil markets in 1982 and the lowering of oil 
prices beginning in 1983 mean that Saudi Arabia's oil revenues will like-
ly decline considerably in the near future, the country's relatively small 
population (about seven million) together with its vast foreign portfolio 
(at least $ I 00 billion) mean that the economy can continue to be con-
sidered one of capital surplus for the forseeable future. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze major movements in the Saudi 
Arabian economy within the concept of a capital surplus developing 
economy and to suggest the necessary considerations - from a Saudi 
point of view - which must be taken into account in order to manage 
the oil based financial surplus. This task is accomplished by: ( I ) 
describing the relationship between growth, inflation and oil revenues in 
the Saudi Arabian economy, ( 2 ) developing a macroeconomic model 
of the economy and ( 3 ) forecasting under different assumptions as to 
the value of exogenous variables, likely growth paths open to the coun-
try during the 1980s and 1990s. 
1. Quoted in Howar Bowen-Jones, "The Third Saudi Abrabian Five-year Plan," the 
Arab Gold Journal (October 1981), p. 55. 
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The quantification and discussion of the key macro-economic rela-
tionships involved is undertaken below. Drawing on these structural 
relationships, an O¥erall model of the economy is developed. The model 
is constructed so that it is capable of identifying the simultaneous in-
teraction of these variables over time. Thus, it is able to determine, 
among other things, whether or not the economy will be close to the 
long run growth objectives articulated in the country's first three 
development plans. It should be noted in this regard that while there i~ a 
high degree of continuity in objectives in the country's development 
plans, shifts, in emphasis do give each plan a distinct character. 
Overview of the Third Plan 
The third plan departs from its predecessors 2 in several areas. Both 
the first and second plans targeted high growth rates in all sectors; this 
carried with it a policy of allowing relatively free importation of foreign 
labor to satisfy demand. The third plan is much more selective, opting 
for high growth in those areas Saudi planners feel have proven poten-
tial. Clearly implied in the plan is the country's major long term objec-
tive, that of containing and eventually reducing the size of the foreign 
labor force. In contrast to the second plan's emphasis on infrastructure 
development designed to increase the absorptive capacity of the 
economy, the emphasis of the new plan is largely on raising the efficient 
utilization of the labor force - domestic and foreign alike - in 
hydrocarbons (usually highly capital intensive) and other manufactur-
ing industries (especially in the agricultural and mining sectors). As in 
the past the overall goal is to diversify the economic bases of the nation. 
While the third five year plan is undoubtedly a more sophisticated 
document than either the first or second, nevertheless it does retain 
much of the character of a project's list, with its financial implications 
not completely 3 worked out. Moreover, the plan seems to suffer from a 
2. For a detailed description of these, see Robert E. Looney, Saudi Arabia's Develop-
ment Potential (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982). 
3. Paul Barker, Saudi Arabia: The Development Dilemma (London: the Economist In-




weakness noted in the previous ones, namely that although manpower, 
infrastructure and other obstacles to economic development are 
acknowledged, they are not included in the central projections. Un-
doubtedly, this is in part a reflection of the dichotomy between 
economic rationality and political experience that exists in the kingdom. 
In support of the third plan, it should be said that a detailed review and 
updating is planned after two years have elapsed and that the planners 
themselves are openly advocating "roll-over" planning on a year by 
year basis as a much more appropriate approach to development in the 
case of a rapidly changing and still largely uncharted economy like 
Saudi Arabia's. 4 
Specifically, with regard to the plan itself, three medium range objec-
tives have been identified and targeted: the structural change of the 
economy, the achievement of participation and social welfare in 
development, and greater economic and administrative efficiency. 
In the analysis that follows attention will be largely focused on the 
structural change aspect of the model. Here Saudi policies are linked to 
three areas of economic activity: oil and gas production; the expansion 
of productive sectors in agriculture, mining and industry; and the con-
tinued development of infrastructure. 
Clearly the on going and primary goal of the government, that of 
economic diversification, requires development of the agricultural, in-
dustrial and mining sectors (Table I). In the government view, the 
private sector can and ultimately should be responsible for the bulk of 
output in these sectors. The government envisions its role largely as a 
catalyst to private sector entrepreneurial activity and investment in these 
areas through its provision of information and research results, of a 
supportive financial framework and investment incentives, and through 
the provision of the required infrastructure. Given the government's 
commitment to free enterprise and market forces, a major objective of 
the country's development strategy is therefore the rapid displacement 




Growth Targets for Non-Oil Economy, 1980-1985 
( OJo growth a year) 
Employment GDP Productivity 
Producing sectors 
Agriculture -2.46 5.35 8.0 
Other mining 6.07 9.78 3.5 
Other manufacturing 9.52 18.83 8.5 
Utilities 8.33 29.46 19.5 
Construction -5.77 -2.48 3.5 
Sub-total -1.48 2.18 3.7 
Services 
Trade 1.80 8.42 6.5 
Transport 5.05 12.93 7.5 
Finance 5.18 7.29 2.0 
Other services 0.94 2.95 2.0 
Government 5.57 7.16 1.5 
Sub-total 3.06 8.84 5.6 
Non-oil economy 1.16 6.19 5.0 
Source: EIU Special Report No. 116 Saudi Arabia: The Development Dilemma 
In contrast to nearly all other third world development plans, if the 
third plan fails to achieve its targets in the time frame alloted, it will not 
be due to financial limitations. Instead, inflationary pressures and pro-
ductivity lags will ultimately determine the plan's likely course and 
eventual attainment. 
Excessive inflation has been acknowledged in the third plan as an area 
requiring constant government attention. Anti-inflationary policy dur-
ing the second plan period included the introduction of subsidies on 
various items as housing and essential foods. In the upcoming five 
10 
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years, the government intends to drastically reduce or even abolish these 
subsidies. Politically, this action will be possible only if the government 
can restrain expenditures and thereby keep inflation within acceptable 
bounds - 7 to 10 percent. 
In many respects 5 the quite short Subsection 3.5, "Inflation" in 
Chapter 3, "Strategy for the Third Plan," is the most illuminating 
single passage in the entire plan document, since within it is contained 
an appreciation of all the forces which have led to the current develop-
ment formula. These include: 
1. the gap between government financed demand on the one hand 
and the required supply of goods, services and labor on the other; 
2. a steep rise in the level of government expenditure could generate 
serious inflationary pressures; 
3. the danger depends not so much on the pressures of demand for 
goods and services as on that for skilled manpower; 
4. outside the government there could be inflationary pressures aris-
ing from the private sector's own autonomous development; and 
5. the rate at which imported inflation could affect the domestic cost 
and price levels remains subject to the efficiency of protective 
measures. 
Each of these statements provides a valuable lead into the plan and 
the opportunities and problems which face the kingdom. 
The third plan's development strategy largely revolves around rapid 
increases in productivity (Table 1). It is estimated that had not the se-
cond plan achieved the productivity increases it did, the labor force re-
quirements would have been more than twice what they were. Similarly, 
the expected increase in productivity in the third plan would translate 
into 550,000 fewer workers needed-a figure of significance when com-
pared to the 155,000 projected as required for the period. As the par-
ticipation rate of the Saudis in the labor force has been declining slight-
ly, the bulk of the workers who would be hired in the absence of in-
5. Bowen-Jones, op. cit., p. 57 
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creased pro.ductivity would be foreign. 6 It should be noted that the 
decline in Saudi participation is a direct result of the expansion of the 
kingdom's education and training programs. 
Capital and skill intensive improvements and developments within 
each of the specific sectors will form the source for productivity growth. 
Despite continued outmigration of labor, agriculture is expected to 
contribute a significant amount to the country's productivity im-
provement. High productivity projects, financed with the aid of the 
Saudi Industrial Development Fund, provide the major impetus on 
which manufacturing is to achieve its targeted increases in productivity. 
Macroeconomic Linkages 
The estimated structural equations attempt to capture several of the 
more important linkages between government activity, economic 
growth and inflation. 
Government spending (Table 2) has grown considerably over the last 
few years, with domestic spending fluctuating in part as a means of 
stabilizing the price level, as evidenced in public statements, and the 
fairly close relationship (Table 3) between government domestic spen-
ding and the net cash flows through government spending. 
Imports have played a large role in reducing domestic inflationary 
pressure (Table 3). At the same time increases in world prices are direct-
ly transmitted into the domestic economy. For example in 1981 
(1400/01) imports (CIF) of the non-oil private sector increased by 21 
percent to Rls IO 1. 6 billion. Adj us ting these for the rise of 9. 6 percent in 
dollar-based CIF import prices and for the appreciation of 1 percent in 
the exchange rate of the riyal against the dollar, the growth in real im-
ports was about 11 percent. Consequent to the rise of 8.6 percent in riyal 
import prices and of 7.8 percent in the non-oil GDP deflator, the 
average cost of supplies rose by 8.3 percent. 
6. Ragaei El Mallakh and Dorthea H. El Mallakh, "The Third Development Plan of 
Saudi Arabia, 1400-1405 A.H.11980-1985 A.D." in Ragaei El Mallakh and Dorthea H. El 
Mallakh, Saudi Arabia: Energy, Developmental Planning, and lndustiralization (Lex-
ington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), pp. 187-188. 
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TABLE 2 
SAUDI ARABIA: GOVERNMENT CASH-FLOW SPENDING, 1977 - 1981 
(Billion Riyals) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
1. Government Spending 128.3 138.0 145.0 188.4 236.6 
2. Total Cash-Flow Spending 104.9 142.2 148.9 178.2 230.7 
a. Direct Foreign Exchange Spending 39.6 43.9 46.0 43.3 73.8 
b. Domestic Spending 65.3 98.3 102.9 134.9 156.9 
3. Domestic Revenue 3.3 4.9 6.4 7.2 9.1 
-
4. Net C~sh-Flows through Government 
w 
Spending 62.0 93.4 96.5 127.7 147.8 
ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH 
1. Government Spending 56.8 7.6 7.2 27.3 25.6 
2. Total Cash-Flow Spending 59.8 35.6 4.7 31.1 16.3 
a. Direct Foreign Exchange Spending 87.7 10.9 4.8 -5.9 70.4 
b. Domestic Spending 46.7 50.5 4.7 31.1 16.3 
3. Domestic Revenue 69.6 48.5 30.6 12.5 26.4 
4. Net Cash-Flows through Government 
Spending 45.6 51.6 3.3 32.3 15.7 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report 1401 (1981). 
TABLE 3 
SAUDI ARABIA: TOTAL SUPPLIES, DEFLATORS, 1975 - 1981 
(Billion Riyals) 
Average Annual 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Growth 1975-1981 
1. Total Supplies at Current Prices 41.7 70.8 105.1 142.8 171.4 214.2 258.6 35.5 
a. Non-Oil GDP 28.1 47.3 67.7 89.9 107.2 129.9 157.0 33.2 
b. Imports (CIF) of Non-Oil 
Private Sector 13.6 23.5 37.4 52.9 64.2 84.3 101.6 39.8 
2. Total Supplies at 1970 Constant 
- Prices 21.7 30.1 39.9 48.6 53.3 60.6 67.5 20.8 ~ 
a. Non-Oil GDP (la deflated by 3a) 12.6 IS.I 17.7 20.2 22.5 25.2 28.2 14.4 
b. Imports (CIF) of Non-Oil 
Private Sector (lb deflated by 3b) 9.1 15.0 22.2 28.4 30.8 35.4 39.3 27.6 
2(b) as OJo of (2) 41.9 49.8 55.6 58.4 57.8 58.4 58.2 5.6 
3. Deflators (1970 = 1.0) 
a. Non-Oil GDP Deflator 2.230 3.130 3.826 4.438 4.761 5.158 5.560 16.5 
~ 
-
b. Riyal Import Price Deflator 1.489 1.565 1.680 1.865 2.084 2.382 2.586 9.6 
c. Total Supplies Deflator 1.922 2.352 2.631 2.936 3.214 3.536 3.830 12.2 
d. Cost of Jiving Index 1.646 2.215 2.915 3.043 3.228 3.285 3.402 12.9 
Source: Computed from Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. 
Note : Riyal import price deflator computed by adjusting the dollar based CIF import price index for any appreciation or depreciation in the 
riyal-dollar exchange rate. 
However, the cost of living index is estimated to have risen by only 
3.6 percent. This is because of a number of factors including the lower 
average of the basket of goods and services included in the cost of living 
index compared with that covered by both the non-oil GDP and im-
ports, and the substantial weight in the index for rents, which have been 
declining, and a number of essential items subsidized by the govern-
ment. 
The government has been the major source of increased private sector 
liquidity (M3) (Tables 4-6). Of the gross liquidity pumped into the 
economy over the ten years, 94 percent came from government cash 
flows and only 6 percent from commercial bank credit. About 86 per-
cent of these gross liquidity flows was absorbed· by net private sector 
balance of payments deficit leaving a balance of 14 percent for increase 
in M3. 
During the second plan period the government's share of gross li-
quidity flow was even higher (95 percent) and a greater proportion of 
these (87 percent) was absorbed by private sector balance of payments 
deficit. The government appreciates the fact that in an economy like 
that of Saudi Arabia, government domestic spending exercises a domi-
nant influence on money supply growth. As noted when the inflationary 
pressures increase (Table 9) the government usually places primary 
reliance on fiscal policy. 
Because of the strong link between government spending and the 
money supply, and given the freedom from all restrictiElns on foreign 
exchange transfers, the role of monetary policy has been limited in 
Saudi Arabia and major changes in monetary expansion have been 
brought about through the regulation of government spending. This 
role of fiscal policy will continue to be important even in the near 
future. 7 
7. "SAMA Prefers Keynes to Monetarists, "Saudi Arabia: A MEED Special Report 






SAUDI ARABIA: FACTORS AfFECTING PRIVATE SECTOR LIQUIDITY, 
FIRST AND SECOND PLAN PERIODS (1970 - 1980) 
(Billion Riyals) 
Plan I Plan II 
(1970-1975) (1975-1980) 
I. Increase in Gross Private Sector 
Liquidity 43.9 445.8 
a. Government Cash Flows 40.1 422.0 
b. Government Bank Credit 3.8 23.8 
2. Net Private Sector Balance of 
Payments Deficit 32.9 387.2 
3. Increase in Private Sector 
Liquidity M3 ( l - 2) 11.0 58.6 
a. Money Ml 8.4 45.0 
b. Quasi Money 2.6 13.6 
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TABLE 5 
SAUDI ARABIA: FACTORS AFFECTINC CHANGES IN M3 
(Billion Riyals) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
1. Gross Liquidity Flows 61.8 96.2 105.0 137.2 158.8 
a. Cash Flows through Government Spen-
ding including Net Loans Disbursed by 
Government-sponsored Credit Institu-
- tions 61.9 93.4 96.5 127.7 147.8 ....J 
b. Increase in Commercial Bank Claims 
on the Private Sector -0.1 2.8 8.5 9.5 11.0 
2. Private Sector Balance of Payments Deficit -48.3 -84.7 -97.5 -127.1 -146.6 
3. Other Items (Net) -0.6 4.8 0.3 1.2 2.6 
4. Increase in M3 12.9 16.3 7.8 11.3 14.8 
-
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report 1401 (1981), p. 8. 
TABLE6 
SAUDI ARABIA: MONEY SUPPLY AND REAL MONEY DEMAND, 1977 -1981 
(Average Annual Rate of Growth) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
I. M3 52.7 43.6 14.5 18.4 20.4 
2. Real Supplies of Goods and Services 30.6 21.8 9.7 13.6 11.5 
3. Inflationary Gap 22.1 11.8 4.8 4.8 8.9 
4. Non-Oil GDP Deflator 22.4 16.0 7.3 8.3 7.8 
5. Import Price Index 4.9 11.0 
-
11.7 14.3 8.6 
00 6. Supply Deflator 11. 7 11.6 9.5 10.0 8.3 
7. Cost of Living Index 25.4 4.4 6.1 1.8 3.6 
-,# 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report 1401 (1981), p. 6. 
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Policy Instruments 
The above trends immediately raise the issue of whether from an in-
stitutional perspective Saudi policy makers have adequate tools to im-
plement the goals of the third plan while at the same time achieving their 
aims of price stability, strong positive growth rates in the non-oil private 
sector, increased private fixed capital formation, moderate interest 
rates, a good supply domestic liquidity (to lubricate the kingdom's rapid 
economic expansion), and predictable - if not stable - riyal exchange 
rate. 
Starting with the exchange rate SAMA prefers a predictable riyal, as 
this helps traders who might otherwise be exposed to fluctuations in the 
rate. SAMA's policy is to peg the riyal within a narrow trading band to 
the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Right (SDR). 
However, the monetary authorities also want to keep riyal movements 
under control. The SDR has recently been moving erratically because of 
the general turbulence of foreign exchange markets. As a result 
SAMA's policy of adjusting the riyal to new parities slowly, means that 
in the first half of 1981 reevaluations of exactly 100 points were made 
nearly every week. 8 On the whole it appears that the authorities are in 
control of the riyal rate and that exchange policy per se should not limit 
the policy makers in striving to achieve the third plan's goals. 
As noted above, fiscal policy is also hampered by planning com-
mitments. The fiscal balance is heavily if not overwhelmingly influenced 
by the five year spending targets. These do not allow conventional fine 
tuning measures. Nevertheless, the way in which the funds are disbursed 
acts as a shorter term regulatory valve on private sector activity and 
consumption. Since the steep inflation of the 1970s, the finance ministry 
has imposed strict control over funds' allocation to spending depart-
ments. Delaying payments helps to prevent over-stimulation. 
The government has shown it is prepared to cut spending programs to 
stop inflation. In the mid-1970s prices rose by nearly 50 percent a year 
and threatened to undermine the development strategy. Budget cuts 




tionary pressures. These policies can be used again frffie economy 
shows signs of running out of control. However, the option is becoming 
increasingly unattractive because of the private sector's continued 
dependence on the flow of public spending; i.e., tight fiscal policy could 
greatly hinder the continued development of many infant manufactur-
ing industries which low cost government funds are helping to bring to 
maturity. 
One feature of the Saudi economy is its negligible taxation, and thus 
limited means of regulating economic activity - particularly consump-
tion. On the political side, any suggestion that government should at-
tempt to take spending power out of the economy through higher taxes 
would likely be extremely unpopular. 9 
Constraints on using fiscal instruments places a greater burden on 
monetary policy as an economic stabilizer. As with fiscal policy, 
however, there are few instruments available. A major problem is that 
the government does not issue debt such as treasury bills. In part the 
absence of government debt stems from the fact that there is no need to 
borrow to finance government spending. 10 More important is the fact 
that Sharia law does not allow interest payments. 
This restriction prevents SAMA from using open market operations 
to drain liquidity from the banking system and rediscounting paper at 
penal interest rates to control bank lending. In effect two of the most 
powerful monetary tools available to most modern central banks cannot 
be used in Saudi Arabia. 
SAMA exercises control through reserve requirements and through 
"moral suasion." As of mid-1981 the main regulations were: 
1. a 7 percent reserve requirement on demand and savings deposits. 
This was relaxed from 15 percent in 1980 to help to relieve a li-
quidity shortage; 
2. a ceiling on the deposit-to-capital ratio of 15 to l; and 
9. William Quaint, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: F.oreign Policy, Security and Oil 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 42. 
10. Ragaei El Mallakh, Saudi Arabia: Push to Development (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1982), pp. 223-225. 
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3. the requirement that the equivalent of 25 percent of deposits must 
be held in liquid assets - deposits with SAMA, cash and callable 
loans. 
Despite the shortage of policy isntruments, the Saudi economy has 
performed exceptionally well in the past. The government has been able 
to contain inflation while at the same time the private sector appears to 
have had access to the credit it requires for continued expansion. If the 
third plan period does not encounter any major unforeseen shocks, the 
policy tools available to the authorities should prove adequate for 
manipulating the economy. 
Macroeconomic Relationships 
The macroeconomic model developed below is designed to examine 
the economy from the point of view of the resources and requirements 
associated with alternative growth scenarios. Ultimately within the 
framework of an optimal control program, it is capable of 
distinguishing the most efficient growth path to the end targets. The 
model's forecasts determine the non-oil income growth rate, the infla-
tion rate and foreign workforce implications of alternative spending 
rates. 
The model is based on the assumptions that: 11 
1. only a limited number of exogenous variables determine all the 
kingdom's basic macro variables; 
2. government expenditures follow a pattern (albeit at a higher level) 
similar to that over the 1960-79 period; 
3. that there are no major alterations in world economic conditions 
during this period; 
4. that the current world oil glut will continue throughout the Third 
Plan period (1981-85). 
Also implicit in the model is the presumption that the public sector's 
role in Saudi Arabia will continue to increase in the third development 
11. An earlier version was presented in Robert E. Looney, "Saudi Arabia's Economic 
Development Strategy: Alternative Crude oil Production Scenarios," NUPI NOT AT No. 
203, Oslo, Norway, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1980. 
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plan reflecting the government's commitment to long term structural 
change. Government involvement in the economy manifests itself in a 
greater provision of financial support and social services. It also in-
volves more government intervention in every sector of the economy to 
ensure that the plan's aims are being fulfilled. 
In short, the model assumes a constant infusion of government ex-
penditures into the economy. Furthermore, that government financed 
demand in Saudi Arabia has its own rather special characteristics which 
are determined fundamentally by the nature of the national economy; 
i.e, that the economy will remain incapable of self-sustained growth 
without continuous government demand manipulation. In this regard, 
while a breakdown of the contribution to the GDP by the oil and non-
oil sectors of the economy at the beginning and at the end of the third 
plan estimates that the value of the former in relation to the latter will 
decline from 165 percent to 130 percent, this grossly underestimates the 
importance of national revenue ultimately derived from the export sale 
of oil. IMF estimates of 92 percent of total revenues from oil exports, as 
against 8 percent from investment income in 1975. provide a more ac-
curate order of magnitude that is unlikely to have changed significantly. 
The third plan statisties themselves indicate very clearly that if one 
isolates the reasonable autonomous producing, commercial and finan-
cial sectors in the GDP from those which are .ultimately reliant on de-
mand created by government oil revenues, the estimates of the propor-
tional importance of the former are of the order of no more than 20 
percent at the beginning and 25 percent at the end of the planning 
period. 12 
The econometric model used to depict the major economic forces at 
work in the economy was estimated (Table 7) by a two stage least 
squares estimation procedure with annual data over the period 
1960-1979, 13 its main features include: 
1. seventeen real (constant 1970) national income accounting equations 
12. Bowen-Jones, op. cit., p. 58. 
13. The estimation procedure is outlined in Bronwyn Hall and Robert E. Hall, Time 




(equations 1-17) and three (equations 18-20) nominal monetary 
features; 
2. a distinction between oil (equations 15) income (OGDPNP) and non-
oil (equation 16) gross domestic product (NOXNP); 
3. the influence of government expenditures (AGENANP) equation I), 
reflecting perhaps public-private competition for resources-crowding 
out of private consumption; 
4. the use of numerous dummy variables (Dl...05) to depict various 
structural changes occurring in the 1970s; 
5. a causal monetary link (equations 18-21) between government 
nominal expenditures (GENAN) government deposits in the banking 
system (SGD), reserve money (SRM), the money supply (M2), and 
inflation-the non-oil GDP deflator (NODF); 
6. the influence of world inflation (ICEUV) on the terms of trade (TT) 
and thus; 
7. a series of exogenous variables, oil price (OilP), and export unit 
values (EUV) depicting the slowdown in world oil demand, and; 
8. the Third Plan goal of reducing foreign work force-labor force 
(EMPT) set at an average annual growth of 1.16 percent per annum. 
Forecast of the Third Plan Period (1980-1985) 
Forecasts for the Third Plan Period were made by incorporating a 
linear programming routine with the model equation. Theoretically, the 
model then became capable of depicting the shape of the country's 
production possibilities surface for each of the Five Plan years. The 
shape of this surface was not fixed but instead was a function of: (I) 
expected demand patterns, (2) resource availability, (3) choice of 
techniques, (4) patterns of supply including import substitution, (5) in-
come growth, and (6) relative prices of goods and factors. Because the 
future production possibilities were predicted by the economic model, 
the predicition then became a function of anothe factor: (7) the struc-
ture of the model itself and the assumptions related to the technique of 
solution. 
The endogenous generation of future production possibility surfaces 




SAUDI ARABIA: KEYNESIAN FORECASTING MODEL 
(Two Stage Least Squares Estimates) 
(Real Variable Block) 
(1) Private Consumption (PCNP) = 0.67PCNPL + 0.30NOXNP-0.44 A GENANP + 0.068 
(4. 74) (4.48) (-3.63) (0.21) OW = 1.65; Se = 0.49 
(2) Private Investment (IPP) = O.llNOXNPL + 1.7703 + 0.33 
(6.42) (8.57) (2.71) OW = 1.75; Se = 0.23 
~ (3) Government Consumption (GCNP) = 0.65GCNPL + 0.57IGP + 0.67 (2.81) (2.23) (1.60) OW = 2.46; Se = 0.89 
(4) Change in Stocks (ISNP) = 0.44NOXNP - 0.21 
(2.95) (-1.18) OW = 2.27; Se = 0.42 
.I (5) Government Non-Oil Revenue (GNREVP) = O. llNOXNP + 1.2703 + 0.27 
(4.14} (3.62) (1.39) OW = 1.84; Se = 0.37 
(6) Government Oil Revenue (GORE VP) = 7.45VPE + 6. 76TT + 25.2703 - 6.61 
(2.62) (5.30) (9.87) (-4.35) OW = 2.59; Se = 2.53 
(7) Imports (ZNANP) = -2.84TINP + 2.01 
(-49.17) (4.97) OW = 1.20; Se = 1.27 
(8) Exports (EP) = 30.23VPE + 1.95 OILP - 5.03 
(4.91) (5.44) (-1.60) OW = 1.08; Se = 6.38 
(9) Net Factor Payments (NFPP) = -0.032EP - 4.08 
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(10) Private Savings (PSPP) = 0.80NOXNP - 2.06 
(5.38) (-1.16) 
(ll)GovernmentSavings(GSP) = 0.71GREVP- l.OIGENANP + 3.31 
(6.83) (-3.31) (2.31) 
(12) Investment in Oil Sector (IOP) = 0.3410PL + 0.51CPP - 0.16 
(13) SAMA Domestic Assets (SOAP) = -0.98NSFAP + 0.52GENANP- I.7ID5 + 0.05 
(-53.16) (4.02) (-2.41) (0.10) 
(14) Monetary System Net Foreign Assets (NSFAP) = 3.15NOXNP- 9.36 
(5.94) (-1.47) 
(15) Oil Sector Gross Domestic Product(OGDPNP) = 16.70 VPE + 15.84TT-20.93D3 - 15.21 
(2. 73) (5. 77) (-3.80) (-4.65) 
(16) Non-Oil Gross Domestic Product (NOXNP) = 0.37KP + 0.059EMPT - 7.24 
(15.40) (5.71) (-3.66) 
(17)Gross Domestic Product(GDPNP) = 23.54VPE + I0.97TT- 6.66 
(3.93) (4.97) (-2.73) 
(Nominal-Monetary Block) 
(18) Government Deposits in Banking System (SOD) = l.23GENAN + 7.96 
(9.16) (1.16) 
(19) Reserve Money (SRM) = 0.21GENAN + 0.076SGD + 1.21 
(3.42) (2.63) (0.87) 
(20) Money Supply (M2) = 0.80SRM + 0.26GENANL + 0.33 
(17.67) (13.31) (1.01) 
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DW = 2.10; Se = 4.18 
DW = 0. 78; Se = 4.37 
DW = 1.92; Se = 0.22 
DW = 1.19; Se = 0.85 
DW = 0.60; Se = 14.93 
DW = 1.69; Se = 5.45 
DW = 2.67; Se = 6.57 
DW = 0.98; Se = 5.42 
DW = 0.63; Se = 25.78 
DW = 1.24; Se = 5.06 









(21) Non-Oil GDP Deflator (NODF) =0.035M2L + 0.096 6.NOXNP + 0.12IGPL + 1.1103 + 0.76 
(3.29) (4.64) (l.90) (12.03) (17.61) QW = 1.92; Se = 0.09 
(22) Gross Domestic Product Deflator (GDPDF) = l.l9CPI + O. l601LP - 0.34 
(10.44) (l l .43) (-2.971 
(23) Consumer Price Index (CPI) = l.SlEXCESSEL + 0.62Dl + 0.62 
(8.15) (4.19) (8.31) 
Identities 
(24) Total Consumption (TCNP) = PCNP + GCNP 
(25) Total Investment (TINP) = IPP + IGP 
(26) Gross Capital Formation (GCF) = TINP + ISNP + IOP 
(27) Gross National Product (GNP) = GDPNP + NFPP 
(28) Total Savings (SNP) = GNP - TCNP 
(29) Domestic Resource Gap (SI) = SNP - GCF 
(30) External Resource Gap (EM) = EP + ZNANP + NFPP 
(31) Terms of Trade (TT) = EUV/ICEUV 
(32) Domestic Absorption (ABP) = TCNP + TINP 
(33) Excess Monetary Pressure (EXCESSE) = M2/ ABP 
Exogenous Variables 
(34) Government Investment (IGP) = Design Variable 
(35) Crude Petroleum Production Index (CPP) 1970 = 1.00 
(36) Oil Price (OILP) = $30 per Barrel 
(37) Volume Petroleum Exports (VPE) 1975 = 100.0 
(38) Industrial Country Export Unit Value (ICEUV) 1970 = 100.0 
(39) Labor Force (EMPT) 
(40) Export Unit Value (EUV) 1970 = 100.0 
DW = 1.74; Se = 0.19 
DW = l.19; Se = 0.22 
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terns of production and resource allocation requires the model to incor-
porate some degree of choice. The linear programming algorithm which 
solved a set of linear inequalities for a constrained maximum developed 
for this problem was characterized by its ability to choose among alter-
native activities. 
For a programming model of this type, it seemed better to maximize a 
general welfare function subject to other more precise national goals 
( which were included in the system as constraints). If there is a conflict 
among goals, the general level of welfare and efficiency in the system 
are not ignored as the government concerns itself with the trade-off 
among policy objectives. 
The objective of maximum non-oil GDP growth subject to inflation 
and foreign labor constraints was chosen mainly because it seemed to 
portray best the government's interest in the kingdom's long term 
socio-economic stability. It is important to note that global profit max-
imization is not the real objective of the country. Indeed, Saudi 
Arabia's foremost concern is with the economy's ability to generate real 
economic development in the domestic non-oil sector without 
dependence on foreign workers or disruption of valued social institu-
tions. 
These considerations were introduced into the model in their simplest 
form; i.e., given the goal of higher income growth, how fast can the 
kingdom's economic expansion occur while the country simultaneously 
reduces its dependence on foreign workers and contains the rate of 
domestic inflation? More specifically, the objective function is formally 
states as: what is the maximum rate of real non-oil gross domestic pro-
duct that can take place without additional foreign workers entering the 
kingdom and the rate of domestic inflation rising above five percent? 
Put differently, what specific increases would occur in non-oil GDP and 
the various macroeconomic aggregates if the inflation and employment 
constraints were relaxed? 
The main exogenous variables (Table 8) are: (1) employment 
(EMPT), (2) world inflation, (ICEUV), (3) export prices (EUV), and (4) 
crude petroleum exports (VPE). 
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TABLE 8 
RATES OF GROWTH OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES 
Varible (Symbol) Low Medium High LP (optimum) 
Employment (EMPT) 3.0 5.0 7.0 1.16 
World Inflation (ICEUV) 3.0 5.0 7.0 5.0 
Export Prices (EUV) -2.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 
Volume Petroleum exports 
(UPE) -2.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 
Forecasts of employment depend on the number of net Saudi workers 
entering the work force plus net immigration. High, low and medium 
forecasts were also set at 3.0, 5.0 and 7.0, respectively, for comparison 
with the Fifth Plan (LP) set at 1.16. 
The volume and price of petroleum exports are forecast to increase at 
1.0 per annum (with the high and low runs of -2.0 and 5.0, respectively, 
set for comparison basis). 
Given these exogenous values, an ex ante prediction technique was 
used to forecast the time path of the endogenous variables. The lagged 
endogenous variables were intergrated beginning with the 1979 figures. 
The linear programming (optional) run was then performed using the 
employment (1.16) and world inflation (5 percent) constraints. 
The model's results (Table 9) indicate that growth coupled with a 
sharp rise in the number of Saudis going through higher education and 
training will clearly put a strain on indigenous labor supplies. However, 
the Planning Ministry plans to keep the demand for extra labor to a 
minimum. Some 300,000 new civilian jobs will be created which will be 
filled by movements of labor from construction and agriculture, an in-
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TABLE9 
SAUDI ARABIA: MACROECONOMIC FORECASTS FOR THE THIRD PLAN PERIOD 
1980 1985 
High Medium Low Optimum High Medium Low Optimum 
PCNP 16.10 15.87 15.66 15.47 31.13 29.25 27.79 26.45 
GCNP 12.55 12.54 12.55 12.53 17.91 17.42 17.00 17.43 
TCNP 28.65 28.41 28.21 28.00 49.04 46.67 44.79 43.88 
TINP (ex ante) 18.71 18.62 18.74 18.64 27.51 25.55 25.87 25.55 
TINP (ex post) 21.63 21.44 20.90 21.08 38.87 33.11 30.97 31.62 
SNP (ex ante) 22.11 19.74 20.72 19.77 33.97 26.35 24.84 24.34 
SNP (ex post) 30.58 27.99 28.09 26.90 43.42 31.46 29.68 28.67 
N Domestic Gap (ex ante) 3.40 1.12 1.98 1.13 6.46 0.80 -1.03 -1.21 
'° Domestic Gap (ex post) 8.95 6.55 7.09 5.82 4.55 -1.65 -1.29 -2.95 
PINP 5.71 5.53 5.34 5.17 9.78 8.90 8.49 8.20 
GINP 11.45 11.36 11.48 11.37 17.21 15.24 15.03 15.23 
GENANP 24.00 23.90 24.03 23.90 35.12 32.66 32.91 32.66 
NOXNP 26.60 25.90 24.86 24.59 49.36 45.60 42.81 40.27 
OGDPNP 31.87 29.78 30.71 29.61 41.91 31.53 30.70 31.35 
GDPNP 58.47 55.68 55.57 54.20 91.27 77.13 73.51 71.62 
NFPD 0.76 0.72 0.72 0.70 1.19 1.00 0.96 0.93 
I • GNPNP 59.23 56.40 56)9 54.90 92.46 78.13 74.47 72.55 External Gap (ex ante) 12.30 9.48 11.14 9.96 18.99 5.48 5.37 8.05 
External Gap (ex post) 8.95 6.55 7.20 5.82 3.36 -2.65 -2.25 -3.88 
ZNANP (ex ante) 42.37 42.37 41.96 41.60 66.68 62.74 61.46 59.86 
ZNANP (ex post) 45.72 45.30 45.90 45.80 82.31 70.87 69.08 71.79 
EP 53.91 53.13 52.38 50.92 85.67 68.22 66.83 67.91 
. I - -
The model indicates the plan's envisaged spending increases could 
aggravate inflation once more. Controlling inflation, however, will be 
more difficult in the Third Plan than in the Second when it was suc-
cessfully combated by fiscal policy, administrative controls and en-
couragement of immigration from other Middle East countries and 
Asia. 
The adverse effects of curbing government spending will be greater in 
the 1980s because of the dependence of a growing number of enterprises 
on low cost government finance and the business generated by public 
sector projects. A considerably larger bureaucracy using up scarce sup-
plies of skilled Saudi manpower would be required to administer a 
comprehensive mix of wage and price controls. 
In general, the forecast is optimistic concerning Saudi Arabia's ability 
to achieve the Third Plan's objectives. Failure to meet the plan targets 
would probably stem for the government's inability to manage the 
economy using traditional macroeconomic policy instruments, such as 
the level of government spending, rather than any particular constraint. 
In this respect the Kingdom is moving into a crucial state of its 
development where the drive to industrialize will become increasingly 
difficult to halt, divert and even manage. 
Long Run Forecasts 
The model is important primarily for short run simulations, but it can 
also be used for longer run forecasts. Dynamic forecasts for 1985 to 
2000 were therefore also made under the same three assumptions for the 
endogenous variables used in the Third Plan forecast. 
Seen in this long run context the results produced a number of in-
teresting patterns including: 
1. Over the period 1978-1900, real non-oil growth varies from a low 
of 10.7 in the low oil export forecast to 12.74 in the high oil export, un-
constrained foreign labor case. 
2. The rate of growth of capital formation is high in all three 







3. Government investment rates of growth are considerably greater 
than public consumption growth in all forecasts. 
4. Inflation is sensitive to the rate of growth varying (again over the 
1978-1990 period) from IO. 34 in the low forecast to 13. 04 in the high 
forecast. 
5. Private expenditure grows at a somewhat slower rate than public 
expenditure with private consumption growth greatly exceeding the 
growth in private sector investment. 
6. The growth in money is nearly in line with non-oil income. 
7. The ex ante savings gap dominates the trade ~ap for all forecasts 
with the gaps tending to increase at lower rates of growth. 
8. The trade gap tends to be positive throughout the forecast period 
for all forecasts where the medium and low rates of growth yield a small 
ex poste negative gap. 
9. These trends continue over the 1990-2000 period with the general 
pattern one of a gradual deceleration of most macro variables to a stable 
growth path. 
IO. Thus by 2000 the average annual real non-Oil growth for 
1978-2000 has declined to 11.42, l 0.10, and 7 .66 for the high, medium 
and low forecasts, respectively, with an inflation rate of 11.98, I0.68 
and 8 .52, respectively. 
11. For the period 1990-2000 itself, these rates are 9.86, 8.47 and 7.48 
for non-0il GDP and I0.97, 9.53 and 7 .3, respectively, for inflation. 
All scenarios indicate that the domestic gap declines from a positive 
to eventually negative position over time. The size of surplus is thus a 
function of the size of government revenues as well as of its expenditure 
pattern over time. Greater surpluses in the early years allow the building 
up of a stock of wealth (while the absorptive capacity remains low). This 
implies that if the absorptive capacity expands, the economy could draw 
upon its foreign portfolio, enabling it to maintain a rapid growth even if 
for some reason oil revenues began to decline. It is those early year 




Before too many conclusions are drawn, however, it must be pointed 
out that the projections made by models of the two gap variety used 
here are quite sensitive to the assumed values of the savings investment 
and import functions. Also there is a great degree of variation in 
judgement as to the extent to which domestic production can be in-
creased to substitute for imports. It would be advisable to appraise for 
instance such variables as imports separately for different broad 
categories of goods (as the emerging import structure would reflect the 
process of adapatation of domestic resources to a multitude of factors 
such as market conditions and technological possibilities). 
Conclusions 
The results of the forecasts for 1980-2000 and the optimization pro-
cedure for 1980-85 suggest the following. 
1. Using a macroeconometric model as well as an operational concept 
of absorptive capacity, it was possible to determine Saudi Arabia's 
growth potential and financial position according to several oil 
scenarios. 
2. Oil revenues are seen to affect the economy both positively and 
negatively. On the positive side, they are still the major growth propell-
ing factor. On the negative side, they are. capable of producing excess 
liquidity and resulting inflation. 
3. Economic growth in Saudi Arabia should be able to be maintained 
at rather high levels without excess inflation while at the same time the 
foreign work force is gradually reduced. Inflationary pressures remain a 
major problem for the Saudi Arabian economy, however, especially 
when we consider the deflationary measures required for its elimination. 
4. In order to maintain a steady growth path over the short, medium 
and longer term, oil revenues must be divided optimally between those 
funds destined for internal use according to absorptive capacity and 






































Government Oil Revenue 
Government Non-Oil Revenue 
Net Factor Payments 
Non-Oil GDP 
Oil Sector GDP 
Sama Reserve Money 
Government Deposits in Banking System 
Money Supply 
Non-Oil GDP Deflator (1970= 1.0) 
Total Government Expenditures 
Terms of Trade 
Government Surplus (deficit) 
Capital Stock Proxy 
Index of Volume of Petroleum Exports 
Oil Price 
Employment 
Price Index, Industrial counting Exports 
















Currency and coin 
plus demand deposits 
















Yes, within limits. 




Yes, within limits. 
Yes, within limits. 
Yes, within limits. 
Yes, within limits. 
Yes, within limits. 
Yes 
No 
Yes, within limits. 
Yes, within limits. 
Yes, within limits. 
Slightly 
Slightly 
No 
